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www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=162898 3 Argentina in the "core" or "periphery", most economic historians would likely concur that Britain was in the core, and Argentina in the periphery. But if the same question is asked about Portugal, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Chile, or the United States of America, we should expect disagreement. This may not matter: "core" and "periphery" may just be heuristic concepts, better used rhetorically than theoretically, meaning "not everybody is alike". But authors using this language usually do so in reference to some specific issue. People dealing with development put rich countries in the core and poor ones in the periphery. People dealing with financial crises put crisis proof countries in the core, and crisis prone countries in the periphery.
People dealing with monetary policy put credible countries in the core and non-credible countries in the periphery. Then of course, talking of core and periphery is tautological.
In practice, testing propositions about different macroeconomic behaviours in groups of countries requires agreed upon groupings. In this paper we provide a formal procedure to identify country groups in the late 19 th century. Our approach is related to the recent research of international macroeconomists such as Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann who emphasize the cross-section heterogeneity of financial vulnerability in modern economies. It is also consistent with the early work of Alec Ford on the operation of the 19 th century international monetary system. 3 Our basic intuition is that systematic differences of macroeconomic behavior can be traced to differences of monetary structures: national currencies vary in terms of their international circulation, so that countries face varied external adjustment constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a criterion to identify the core and the periphery of the international monetary system. Section II shows how this criterion can be translated into a matrix of bilateral exchange relations. Section III uses network statistics to describe this matrix. Section IV relies on so-called "block-modeling" techniques to construct a simplified picture of international monetary relations in the late 19 th century. We conclude with directions for future research.
Missing markets matter: core, periphery, and the adjustment mechanism.
Our purpose is not to review the substantial literature that has used the concepts of "core" and "periphery." This notion, for all its vagueness, has been used by Neo-classical and Marxists authors alike, suggesting that appeal has not been tarnished by imprecision. In broad terms, we understand that people thinking in such terms believe that structures do matter.
To talk rigorously of core vs. periphery, one has to address three related and difficult rise in the interest rate by the central bank of country B will induce both residents and foreigners to increase their holdings of currency B. But a similar move by the monetary authorities of country A will have no effect on foreigners and can only work through the repatriation of foreign balances by residents of country A: And thus the asymmetry in external adjustment.
The structural ingredient we have considered is also a prominent feature of the pre-1914 international monetary system. A stands for Argentina, B for Britain and, as monetary historians know, there was no peso market in London. By contrast, in the returns of the Buenos Aires stock exchange we find plenty of evidence of a large and liquid market for sterling. A key theme of Alec Ford's classic book on the pre-1914 gold standard is that the international adjustment mechanism did work differently in different countries. 5 Ford emphasized that external adjustment was easier in the "center" (Britain) and more difficult in the "periphery" (Argentina.) 6 We have just argued that there were good reasons for that.
Who's Quoting Whom?
In this section we document the international status of the various currencies in the late 19 th century. As noted long ago by Peter Lindert, this cannot be done by computing aggregate statistics of private foreign holdings: such data are lost. 7 We suggest taking an indirect route.
We use individual countries' "Course of exchange" bulletins to collect information on the availability of every single currency in every single foreign exchange market. 5 Ford, Gold standard. See also Eichengreen, "Gold Standard". Similar issues are today at the heart of discussions of the US current account "problem". Those who argue, as Dooley, FolkertsLandau and Garber, "Bretton Woods", th at these disequilibria are not a concern emphasize the unique position of the US dollar at the "core" of the international monetary system.
The "Course of exchange" as a primary source
The late 19 th century saw the apogee of a foreign exchange system that had developed towards the end of the Middle Ages: international trade transactions were achieved through the use of "bills of exchange". These were essentially negotiable bank overdrafts. They were issued to finance trade between distant places. Shipping commodities between two centers entailed a waiting period between the time when the exporter sent the goods and the time cash rolled in. Bankers enabled importers to draw on them a "bill of exchange" in order to settle purchases. Such bills could then be traded: Genoa holders of, say, bills payable in Barcelona, could sell them to Genoa debtors of Barcelona. The local existence of a supply and demand for bills payable in a foreign center created foreign exchange markets. Modern studies of liquidity in foreign exchange markets rely on a measure known as the "bid-ask spread". This spread measures the distance between the buying and selling prices in a dealers' market. 15 A narrow market has few dealers. This reduces competitive pressure and leads to a broadening of spreads. Such an "ideal" measure is not available for the late 19 th century, except for a few instances. 16 But the network matrices described above provide 15 See Hartmann, Currency competition. 16 The quotes of The Economist, however, must have been an example of bid-ask spreads, since "money" prices were the bid prices, the prices at wh ich people were willing to buy foreign exchange a proxy for liquidity: evidence of active trade reveals the existence of a sufficiently large demand and supply to warrant the posting of prices. Our dummy variable quoted/not quoted is therefore essentially an index of the bid-ask spread, and thus a measure of liquidity.
We got a strong sense of this while examining the data. For any given market the precise list of foreign currencies changed over time: some currencies were dropped, others were added. The disappearance of a given currency from the "Course of exchange" listings usually followed a period when reported quotes had become occasional, suggesting a fading market. 17 Such was the case, for instance, of the Brazilian currency, quoted in London in the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s, and which disappeared afterwards. Conversely, the emergence of a new currency in the list generally followed a period for which we found occasional references outside the "Course of exchange" (i.e. in the press or in contemporary handbooks) to the availability of the said currency. 18 In sum, the existence of an active quote for a given currency is a reliable indicator of the existence of a liquid underlying market.
This can be proven using evidence from the Lisbon foreign exchange market. In the Crédit lyonnais archives we found information on the buying and selling prices for foreign bills as and offering local money, while "paper" was the price at which people were offering to sell the bills. Another example is Vienna, wh ich recorded "Geld" (money) and "Waare" (paper) prices.
17 Alternatively, posted prices didn't change, while a ll other rates were moving. This is a sure indication tha t no transactions were tak ing place: market authorities were just copying the la test ava ilable transaction on and on. they were posted in Lyonnais' Lisbon subsidiary, the Crédit Franco-Portugais. These were the over-the-counter prices at which the bank would sell or buy foreign drafts. As any bank, the Crédit Franco-Portugais could draw on, or remit in, any imaginable center. For instance, Crédit lyonnais, which had a branch in Saint-Petersburg, could easily sell a Russian bill to a Portuguese customer. For other centers, it could do the same using foreign correspondents.
Comparing the bid-ask spreads posted by the Crédit Franco-Portugais for drafts on centers quoted in the Lisbon market and on centers not quoted there provides a test of our main proposition (Table 1) . Our source for the Lisbon foreign exchange market is the Jornal do Comercio, the main business journal. As can be seen, the lowest bid-ask spreads (less than 0.5% for bills on London, Paris, Berlin, or Amsterdam) were precisely for the centers that featured most prominently in the foreign exchange market listings. Countries that were not part of the foreign exchange market listings had typically higher spreads (above 1% and much higher). Quotation is therefore a predictor of a narrow bid-ask spread.
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** as an index that takes value one when liquidity in a given market reaches a certain critical "liquidity threshold" and zero otherwise: "quoted" is synonymous for "liquid in that 19 Bouvier, Crédit lyonnais.
center." Network matrices provide a bitmap image of the grayscales of international liquidity.
Data collection
We then set to investigate individual countries' listings. Orleans, Chicago, San Francisco.) One possibility would have been to identify centers rather than countries. However, this was not feasible since a number of listings aggregated foreign regional markets: instead of quoting, say, "Antwerp" and/or "Brussels" they reported "Belgian centers" (most probably because of nationwide clearing arrangements that made regional centers close substitutes to one another for foreign dealers.) Given this situation, aggregating along national lines was the only sensible option.
The network of international exchange 1890-1910
The main features of networks can be summarized through a set of descriptive statistics:
measures of average distances, measures of centrality, and groupings.
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The four "Ds": dyads, density, distribution, distance
The basic unit of analysis in a network is the "dyad". Dyads record relations between two individuals in a pair. They take three possible forms: zero connection, one connection, or 22 Wasserman and Faust, Network analysis.
two connections and are denoted as "(0, 0)", "(1, 0)" and "(0, 1), or (1, 1)". In 1900 for instance, the dyad "Britain and Argentina", is equal to (0,1).
Density refers to the number of links in the network (number of times x ij =1), compared with the number of possible links (Nx (N-1) ). Suppose that the likelihood to have a link between two countries is 50-50. The density ratio is then 0.5. As shown in table 2, about 90% of the possible links were zeros: pre-1914 international monetary relations formed a highly parsimonious network.
Distribution of the dyadic links is another important variable. Their distribution across the three groups (0, 0), ((1, 0) or (0, 1)), and (1, 1) can be compared with what would obtain if links were drawn randomly (given the network density, which tells the probability to have a link between i and j). Table 2 shows that our network has less (0,1) and (1,0) but more (0,0) and almost four times as much (1,1) than implied by a random drawing. This suggests a greater tendency, ceteris paribus, towards reciprocal links.
Distance measures the average minimum number of "stops" that one needs to make in order to go from one country to another. This measure is taken regardless of the direction of the connection. In 1890, going from Argentina to China involved two possible shortest routes, each two stops long. 23 Distance thus measures the "closeness" of agents in the network. As seen in Table 2 , the average distance is around 1.80, meaning that on average it takes less than two stops to go from one currency/financial center to another one: all countries are either directly connected, or more often, connected via a third one. This points towards a highly hierarchical system. 23 These were (a) Buenos Aires-London and London-Sh a nghai and (b) Buenos Aires-Paris and Paris-S h angha i.
"In-" and "out-" degrees
This brings to the fore the question of centrality. Network statisticians study centrality by focusing on the individual level. There are two ways an individual can relate to others: he or she can "send" or "receive" links. The corresponding links counts are known respectively as "out-degrees" and "in-degrees" or more informally "expansiveness" (propensity to "name" others) and "popularity" (tendency to be "named" by others). Figure 2 presents the in-and out-scores. The ranking is made according to the in-degrees, since "popularity" is the relevant criterion to judge the extent of foreign circulation of a given currency. Out-degrees by contrast probably reflect in part the heterogeneity of data sources, in part local foreign exchange market arrangements which caused some "Courses of the exchange" to report systematically more currencies than others, and in part structural characteristics leading some countries to diversify over a larger range of foreign currencies. A possible limitation of the in-degrees as a measure of centrality is that they fail to weigh individual quotes according to the importance of those from whom they come. That
Montevideo is quoted in Buenos Aires is not the same thing as being quoted in London. One can think of many different exogenous variables to weigh a quote in Argentina against a quote in Great Britain. We propose here an approach that is based on the intrinsic characteristics of the network, relying on the work of Stanley Wasserman and Katherine
Faust, who present a whole family of status or "rank prestige" measures. The general idea is that the prestige of an actor depends not only on the number of times he or she is chosen but also on the prestige of those who choose him or her. An actor chosen by a lot of prestigious actors should also enjoy a high prestige, while someone selected by low ranked actors only should not. The interpretation for our monetary network is simple: a currency is more central if it is quoted in markets that are themselves home to a central currency. The result is an alternative centrality criterion, known as "eigenvector centrality".
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Figure 3 contrasts "eigenvector centrality" in 1900 with the earlier "popularity" index.
The hierarchy within the leading trio of pound, franc and mark disappears: that the pound is quoted everywhere no longer makes a difference since franc and mark are quoted in all "relevant" places. By the same account, the centrality of the Belgian and the Swiss franc, the lira and the Austrian crown increases significantly reflecting the fact that these currencies are quoted in markets that are themselves relevant. The same is to a lesser extent true for
Scandinavian nations who benefit from their being quoted in Berlin. The big loser, on the other hand, is the US dollar, because it is mainly quoted in North and South America and East Asia, and not in the European centers.
*** Insert Figure 3 about here *** These results are suggestive: By discriminating between more and less weighty markets, eigenvector centrality captures perhaps more closely the idea of a currency's "catchment area". We can thus identify a tightly knitted group of countries around London, Paris and Berlin, which includes Belgium or the Netherlands but also Italy and Austria-Hungary. In a second row we find the Iberian and Scandinavian countries, as well as Russia. These manage to extend their reach through listing in some leading foreign exchange market. It is to this second row that the US can be compared, as a result of the "junior" status of the quotes it receives.
24 For the deriva tion of the eigenvector centra lity measure see Appendix 3.
Cliques
The previous discussion leads to another way of looking at interconnectedness. The idea is to identify "cliques", that is, groups of countries that have fully symmetrical relations.
Members of a given "clique" do quote and are quoted by every other members of the same clique. Of course, any sub-group of a given clique is a clique, so that in practice it is enough to report the largest possible cliques. Results are presented in Table 3 . Cliques tend to be predominantly European. Within Europe, some regional sub-groups are also discernible, such as the North Western European groups, the German-Scandinavian group, etc. We also have some smaller (three members) cliques emerging after 1900 in Asia (the Hong Kong, Shanghai, Bombay, and the Tokyo, Shanghai, Bombay triangles). This is in striking contrast with the Latin American world. *** Insert Table 3 about here ***
1900: a map
To conclude, we provide a map for 1900. 
Identifying Currency Groups: A Model
We have seen that some countries have similar ways to interact with one another and with third parties. For instance, France and England quote each other and are quoted by almost all non-European nations. It would be very useful, therefore, to generalize the concept of "cliques" and put together individuals in "classes" defined by homogeneous intra-class and inter-class patterns. We do this by applying "block-modelling", a network analysis method that groups actors by identifying classes of countries (or "actors") that have similar relational patterns. In an ideal case, the classes would fully determine its members' relational patterns: countries in the same class would be tied to other countries in exactly the same way: they would be said to be "structurally equivalent". Description of a network comprising many agents then boils down to specifying relations among a few groups of individuals.
Imagine for instance that our monetary network only has two types of countries. "C" countries would always quote each other and never quote "P" countries. "P" countries would never quote each other but always "C" countries. One could then refer to "C" countries as core countries, characterized by supremacy over the "P" nations, while "P" countries would be adequately termed peripheral, as they would hobnob to the international monetary system via the intermediation of "C" countries. Such a perfect equivalence, if it did exist, would be empirically easy to identify. Of course, our monetary network does not display this very appealing feature.
However, we can look for "near structural equivalence". This means putting the analysis into a stochastic framework, and assuming that network links across groups are drawn from probability distributions: if they belong to the same class, countries i and j have the same ex ante probability to quote currency k. Ex post, they may end up with different realized links with k. But on average they will quote k just as often. The idea is therefore to back up the network structure from the realized (a posteriori) observed links. In the end, block-modelling identifies the structure that fits the data best.
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Here is how the program works: it seeks to infer from the data how many different (latent) classes of actors can be distinguished and to which class each actor belongs. It does so by estimating the posterior probability distribution of a given class structure. Membership 25 See Wang and Wong, "Blockmodels"; and Nowicki and Snijders "Estimation and prediction." of the actors in certain classes and the probabilities of ties between and within the classes are determined in an iterative procedure that seeks to maximize the likelihood of the observed patterns. Block-modelling then provides goodness-of-fit statistics to assess a particular partition of actors into classes, as well as probabilities regarding the membership of individual countries in a given group. This is a powerful way to provide firm statements about the geography of money.
A three-tier world
Identifying the number of groups requires trading off detail (summarized in the "Information" statistic, or I y ) against relevance (measured by the "Clarity" statistic or H x ).
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Information and Clarity are maximized when their corresponding statistics are minimized.
The intuition for why there should be two statistics rather than one is the following: just like the R 2 gets improved in standard regressions by adding new explanatory variables, Information is always improved by adding new categories: there is therefore a need to adjust the amount of "Information" provided by increasing categories by the amount of "Clarity" this yields. However, unlike what happens in standard regression analysis, there does not exist at this stage any statistic to weigh Information against Clarity, so that output must be interpreted carefully.
Results are reported in Table 4 . A big gain in terms of Information is always obtained by going from 2 to 3 groups. This result is confirmed by the Clarity criterion, which is minimized for 3 groups in 1890 and for 2 or 3 groups in 1900. For 1910 the results are less obvious, with structure is the one that fits the data best. There were three, not two, groups of countries in the international monetary system of the late 19 th century, and rather than describing it in terms of "core" and "periphery", we should refer to "key", "intermediate" and "peripheral" countries.
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** Let's now consider the composition of each group (Table 5) . We focus on the three-tier grouping. The key currency group is the most clearly identified. 27 It comprises, for all periods, the pound, the franc and the mark. This matches Peter Lindert's identification of these very three as the leading currencies in the late 19 th century. Note that Lindert's conclusions rested on evidence that these "key" currencies were held by foreign central banks. 28 Of course, for foreign exchange market intervention one prefers a currency with a liquid market, which squares nicely with our starting assumption.
The second group of intermediary currencies mostly comprises European nations. The surprise is that in this category we do find, besides the US, both the likes of Switzerland, Belgium or the Netherlands and countries such as Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, and Spain.
However, this finding is in line with recent work, which has found evidence for supposedly "peripheral" countries, such as Austria-Hungary, of exchange rate management techniques that have conventionally been associated with "core nations". Unlike 'genuine' peripheral countries, such nations seemed had a "European" (if not an international) circulation that made them more similar to their North-Western European counterparts. 29 Due to their links 27 The probability for the three currencies to be in the same group is always higher th an 90%, and the probability for all other currencies to be among the key group inferior to 10%. 28 Lindert, Key currencies. 40% to be in fact with the periphera l group. 31 The blockmodel suggests th is fourth cluster as optimal for 1910 only, but the group appears in 1890 and 1900 as well, as soon as a four-tier structure is allowed.
or German mark. It is only in 1910 that we find it emerging on the top of the intermediary league. 32 This rapid rise distinguishes it from any other country in the world. At the same time, this ascendancy seems somewhat delayed given that by 1910 the US economy had already taken over in many areas. This is undoubtedly something that future research should focus on.
Finally, if we restrict the software to grouping countries on the basis of a two-tier system, we inevitably fall back on a list of "core" countries that essentially pools the list of "key"
and "intermediate" countries: thus, if we really want to picture global monetary relations as a dual system, then we should be prepare to grant seniority to a much larger pool of nations than research has so far acknowledged. The superior alternative is to recognize that there were really three groups.
It is now time to provide a simplified characterization of the international monetary system. This is done in Figure 5 . A straight arrow from group A to group B does mean "members of group A do quote members of group B with probability x" (reported near the arrow). Reflexive arrows mean "members of group A do quote counterparts in group A with probability x" (reported near the arrow). As seen, key countries always quote each other's currency (100%). They generally quote intermediate countries (92%) but barely any peripheral countries. Intermediate countries almost always quote key currencies (96%), and fellow intermediate currencies half of the time (45%). They never quote peripheral currencies.
Finally, peripheral countries almost never quote each other (3%), rarely the intermediate currencies (10%), and most of the key currencies (75%).
Two conclusions are in order. First, as is apparent in Figure 5 , the pre-1914 international monetary order exhibited much hierarchy. Second, key countries and intermediary countries had almost symmetrical relations so that in a world restricted to these two groups, there 32 "The top of the intermediary league" means the following: at th a t date, wh ile clearly in the intermediary group, it has the largest probability in its class to be part of the key currencies.
would be no real point opposing one group to the other one. In effect, it is the periphery that enables to discriminate between the two top groups, through the sharp contrast between the relationships it entertained with each category. In other words, it is the periphery that permits to tell the key and intermediary groups apart.
Conclusions
This paper started from the premise that any country's adjustment mechanism depends heavily on the degree of the international circulation of its currency. We identified an indicator of international liquidity, captured by a dichotomous variable reflecting the existence of directional relations between countries' financial markets. Such variables are amenable to modern network analysis techniques, and we provided a procedure for automatically identifying "core" and "peripheral" nations around 1890-1910.
This procedure yielded a striking result. The monetary order of the late 19 th century is best described as having been made of at least three groups, rather than the two groups generally referred to. Specifically, we found, between Peter Lindert's "key currencies" (pound sterling, franc and mark), and the currencies in Alec Ford's "periphery" (the Argentine peso being the archetype), a middle class, mostly made up of European nations, but through which the United States passed on its way to the top. Alternatively, if only two groups are to be identified, then we are bound to call "core" nations a much broader group than is conventionally considered. Most strikingly, such countries as Italy, or Russia, Spain, or Austria-Hungary were definitely not peripheral. Their currencies enjoyed a regional circulation and were known to bankers in a number of leading European centers.
We hope that these findings will provide a firmer basis for future empirical work seeking to contrast economic performances in alternative groups of countries. The classifications reported in Table 5 can motivate more rigorously the use of separate regressions for different groups. Similarly, the indices of centrality that we constructed can be used as controls of the influence of centrality in econometric work. For the convenience of future research, the readers can find in Appendix 1 two brands of centrality indices.
Future research will need to explain the emergence of the structure we identified, and to measure carefully how much it did matter. The first question is Terra Incognita. On the second issue, research is also needed, but there is already evidence that the structure identified did matter. For instance, we know that "core" and "intermediary" countries were able to circulate debts denominated in their own currency on foreign markets, while members of the periphery were not. 33 Similarly, recent research has reported evidence of a greater contribution of exchange rate movements to external adjustments in countries belonging to our "periphery" -unsurprisingly given that they could not borrow so easily abroad. 34 More work is needed to go beyond these general remarks. But we believe our findings might open new perspectives. These perspectives should, at the very least, have the potential to free us from the conventional reference, when it comes to explaining the pre-1914 international monetary order, to those famous "rules of the game" of which it is only known that they never existed. , 1900 , 1905 , 1912 TMC 1893 , 1908 Philippines Manila SD1889, 1900 , 1905 , 1912 TMC 1893 , 1908 SD 1889 , 1900 , 1905 , 1912 TMC 1893 , 1908 Venezuela Caracas SD 1889 , 1900 , 1905 , 1912 TMC 1893 , 1908 Note: TMC and SD refer respectively to Tate's Modern cambist and Sonndorfer followed by the year of the edition used. Notes: Random distributions are computed conditional upon the network density, i.e. if the network density is 0.110, we assume that there is a 11% probability that there exists a link between country i and country j. Source: Authors' computations. DEU  BEL  NLD  USA  AUH  ITA  CHE  ESP  HKG  IND  CHN  RUS  SWE  SGP  DNK  JPN  NOR  PRT  JAV  PHL  BRA  FIN  URY  AUS  ARG  CEY  CHL  CUB  ICH  CAN  COL  ECU  EGY  GRC  MEX  NZL  OTT  PER  PRS  ROM  SER  SIA  VEN In-degree centrality Eigenvector centrality
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